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THE WHOLE THING
Mark Tushnet*
The question seems to me badly posed, for two reasons. It
assumes that constitutional provisions "are" something-or-other,
which can be laid against the metric by which we measure stupidity. But, as that allusion to United States v. Butler suggests, it is
no longer clear to many of us that constitutional provisions have
such a quality.
Consider for example someone who believes that the metric
for stupidity is defined by the degree to which a policy advances
the interests of some particular favored group. Perhaps at one
time the First Amendment as then interpreted advanced those
interests, because the major threats to the political program favored by that group came from government agents. The First
Amendment was at that time not a stupid provision.
As time passed, two things happened. (a) The group's political program changed, so that now the main threats come from
non-governmental actors. Even if nothing else occurs, the Hrst
Amendment, now less important to the group than before, is
"more stupid" than it used to be. Perhaps, though, it does not
cross some threshold of stupidity if it is merely less important.
(b) The prevailing interpretation of the Hrst Amendment
changed, so that now it provides greater protection for the
group's political adversaries than it did earlier. Now the First
Amendment really might be the Constitution's most stupid provision, depending on how dramatic the changes in interpretation
are.
Is that the most helpful way to describe what has happened,
though? I can certainly imagine someone taking the position
that the Hrst Amendment, properly interpreted, is not stupid at
all. For such a person, "the First Amendment" is just fine; the
problems arise solely because it has been badly interpreted.
In short, to identify any provision as stupid requires that one
have a fairly strong theory of interpretation and interpretive error. It is not clear that such a theory is available.
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Second, and for me more important, trying to locate a single
provision as the most stupid may be misguided. At least I would
like the opportunity to answer along these lines: "Most of Article
I, much of Article II, a fair chunk of Article III, nearly all of
Article VI, and many of the Amendments." It has occurred to
me, though, that that answer is equivalent to: "Article V."
My concern is that the basic structure of our national government may be unsuitable for contemporary society. This is
only a concern, not a firm conclusion, and in what follows I simply want to indicate lines of thinking that might be productive.
Consider the following propositions drawn from observations by political scientists interested in constitutional structures.
Political systems with single member districts in which the candidate who receives a plurality of the vote wins, tend to have twoparty systems, while those with multimember districts and proportional representation tend to have multi-party systems.!
"Electoral laws that tum plurality preferences into legislative
majorities are likely to be especially disastrous in highly divided
societies."2 "[P]arliamentary democracies tend to increase the
degrees of freedom that facilitate the momentous tasks of economic and social restructuring facing new democracies as they
simultaneously attempt to consolidate their democratic
institutions. "3
These observations suggest that the arguments for proportional representation and a parliamentary system are stronger
than many United States constitutionalists, brought up in a presidential, plurality-winner system, think they are. Of course the
particular historical circumstances of the United States may
make those arguments unpersuasive. The United States is not a
new democracy, for example, for which parliamentarism might
be especially suitable. Social divisions in the United States may
not be so severe as to require proportional representation as a
partial solution. Two-party systems address social division by d~
veloping coalitions within the parties rather than through multiparty governing coalitions as in systems with proportional representation; that solution might be appropriate to the degree to social division that exists in the United States.
1. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Mod·
ern State (Methuen, 1954).
2. R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, When and How Do Institutions Matter?,
in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter?: Government Ca·
pabilities in the United States and Abroad 458 (Brookings Inst., 1993).
.
3. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks and Democratte
Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism, 46 World Politics 1, 4 (1993).
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The Constitution creates a presidential system. To some degree it conduces to the adoption of plurality-winner electoral systems for Congress, and thereby to the development of a twoparty system. Creative constitutional interpretation and statutory design might overcome these apparent obstacles to the
adoption of an alternative regime.4 Nonetheless, the very weight
of the existing electoral and political system may impede creative
thinking about institutional, and therefore constitutional, design
for the United States.s
What is the source of this "weight"? Of course, to some extent, history itself, and the fact that the existing constitutional
structures seem to many to be functioning reasonably well. Another source, though, might be the Constitution itself.
The weight of existing structures would be less, though it
would not disappear, if it were easier to amend the Constitution.
Perhaps some degree of institutional stability is required for a
system to warrant the name constitutional, which suggests that it
should not be too easy to amend all of a constitution's provisions,
or perhaps any of its basic institutional prescriptions. There may
be room, however, between the desire to avoid creating an
amendment process that is too easy to use, and sticking with the
present strong super-majority requirements of Article V.6
But, if the Constitution were amended to alter the supermajority requirements for its own amendment, could the new
process eliminate the equal representation of the states in the
Senate?

4. Nothing in the Constitution appears to require that members of the House of
Representatives be elected from single-member districts rather than state-wide, for example. Perhaps Congress has the power to prescribe multi-member districts and proportional representation for the House of Representatives, pursuant to its power to "make
... Regulations" for the "Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections," Art. I,§ 4.
But it seems to me awfully difficult to figure out a way to devise a system of proportional
representation in the Senate that is compatible with the requirements of (a} equal representation of each state in the Senate, Art. I, § 3 (and Art. V}, and (b) the staggered
elections for the Senate, Art. I, § 3.
5. No one should have been surprised when politicians elected under a pluralitywinner system were uncomfortable with the scholarship of Lani Guinier, which argues for
moves in the direction of proportional representation.
6. Akhil Amar's suggestion that the existing Constitution accommodates a mechanism for constitutional amendment outside of Article V indicates that, even here, it might
not be proper to call Article V "stupid." Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited:
Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988).

